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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of three experiments that explore the breadth of the 
relevant discourse context in language production and comprehension. Previous evidence 
from language production suggests the relevant context is quite broad, based on findings 
that speakers differentiate new discourse referents from similar referents discussed in past 
contexts (Van Der Wege, 2009). Experiment 1 replicated and extended this “lexical 
differentiation” effect by demonstrating that speakers used two different mechanisms, 
modification, and the use of subordinate level nouns, to differentiate current from past 
referents. In Experiments 2 and 3, we examine whether addressees expect speakers to 
differentiate. The results of these experiments showed no evidence of an expectation for 
differentiation, for either lexically differentiated modified expressions (Experiment 2), 
nor for subordinate level nouns (Experiment 3). Taken together, the present findings 
suggest that the breadth of relevant discourse context differs across language production 
and comprehension. Speakers show more sensitivity to things they have said before, 
possibly due to better knowledge of the relevant context. In contrast, listeners have the 
task of inferring what the speaker believes is the relevant context; this inferential process 
may be more error-prone.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 Reference is a central component of language use and is often accomplished 
through the use of definite referring expressions such as the shirt. Reference occurs with 
respect to a context and as such, when using a definite referring expression, the speaker 
must identify the intended referent with respect to the context. Choosing how much 
information to provide in order to identify the referent with respect to the context thus 
becomes a critical task that the speaker must accomplish. According to Grice (1975, 
p.45), these referential processes are facilitated by a mutual expectation on the part of 
conversational participants to obey the following cooperative principle: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange 
in which you are engaged.  
 The present research is concerned with a particular aspect of the cooperative 
principle called the maxim of Quantity, which states that speakers should make their 
contribution as informative as is necessary without being overinformative. By following 
these principles, the speaker can ensure successful communication by including just 
enough information in order to allow an addressee to understand the speaker’s intended 
meaning. Providing too much information would be inefficient, and potentially 
confusing. Providing too little information would not allow the addressee to grasp the 
speaker’s meaning. Importantly, since the amount of necessary information is constrained 
by the characteristics of the context, the key question, then, is what constitutes the 
context?  
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Consider for example, if a speaker wants to refer to a dress shirt in a context 
containing a single shirt, a ball and a pair of pants. In such a context, she would likely use 
the basic level noun “shirt” because all other things equal, this basic level noun is the 
easiest to retrieve and produce, despite the fact that a superordinate noun such as clothing 
would suffice (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; Brennan & Clark, 
1996). By contrast, in a context that contains a dress shirt and a sleeveless shirt, a more 
specific term such as dress shirt would be required. Thus, the amount of information 
required to uniquely identify the referent depends on what we will refer to as the 
immediate referential context (Olson, 1970; Osgood, 1971). Indeed, speakers show 
striking sensitivity to the informativity of referential expressions given the immediate 
context (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Beun & Cremers, 1998; Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 
2006), even in cases where evaluating the context requires attention to multiple 
dimensions of the scene and task at hand (Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2008). This 
sensitivity surfaces both in the production of modifiers (e.g., the striped shirt), and 
subordinate nouns (e.g., the blouse), to distinguish the intended referent from the 
alternatives. While these findings are robust, it bears note that referential form is not 
always rigidly determined by context, as speakers readily produce unnecessary modifiers 
in situations where they have not fully analyzed the context (Deutsch & Pechmann, 1982; 
Pechmann, 1989), and in cases where they have additional communicative goals (Ford & 
Olson, 1975; Mangold & Pobel, 1988; Brown-Schmidt & Konopka, 2011; Brennan & 
Clark, 1996).  
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What is the context? 
 Given that utterance form depends on the referential alternatives in the context, a 
key question is what constitutes the context that interlocutors consider while they 
communicate. A case in point is face-to-face conversation, where despite being in the 
same environment, each person has different information in their field of view, and 
comes to the conversation with different background knowledge. According to one view, 
conversational partners assume that the relevant discourse context is restricted to jointly 
known information, also known as common ground (Clark, 1992, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986; Stalnaker, 1978). Common ground is thought to be composed of 
information that is, or was, physically co-present, linguistically co-present and culturally 
co-present for the two interlocutors (Clark & Marshall, 1978; 1981). While extensive 
evidence suggests that interlocutors represent information about common ground, and use 
this information to guide language processing (Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; 
Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992), the scope of the influence of common ground in on-line 
language processing is debated (e.g., Keysar, et al., 1998). Further, the ways in which 
different types of contextual information differentially guide language processes are 
poorly understood. 
Here we focus on contextual changes throughout a conversation, and examine 
whether previous contexts shape the perception of the immediate context. In particular, 
we examine the distinction between information in the immediate or ahistorical context, 
as compared to information jointly experienced in previous contexts, or the historical 
context (Brennan & Clark, 1996). Following Brennan and Clark, we suggest that the 
relevant context for a discourse includes both the immediate context as well as the 
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relevant historical context. Evidence that interlocutors are sensitive to information in the 
immediate context is extensive. For example, in a situation in which both a speaker and a 
listener are able to see a single shirt, the speaker can readily refer to that shirt (e.g., “Pass 
me the shirt.”, Clark & Marshall, 1981), without having to contrast her expression against 
shirts that only the speaker knows about (e.g., the shirts in her closet at home). Indeed, in 
the absence of external pressures (e.g., time pressure, task demands), in situations such as 
this one, speakers easily design expressions with respect to jointly visible objects (Horton 
& Keysar, 1996; Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002), and listeners 
primarily restrict their domain of interpretation to those objects that are jointly visible 
(Hanna, et al., 2003; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008; also see Brown-Schmidt, 
Gunlogson & Tanenhaus, 2008; cf. Keysar, et al., 1998). 
Less well understood is how the joint historical context guides language 
processing decisions. The historical context is thought to include information that was 
previously, and jointly experienced by the interlocutors, and thus in the interlocutors’ 
common ground (Brennan & Clark, 1996). The historical context includes previously 
experienced linguistic and visual events, such as jointly created conceptual pacts for how 
to refer to specific entities (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), as 
well as lexically entrained terms (Garrod & Anderson, 1987). Indeed, some recent 
evidence suggests that addressees are sensitive to common ground for previously-
mentioned linguistic information (Hanna, et al., 2003; Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Metzing & 
Brennan, 2003; Brown-Schmidt, 2009). In what follows, introduce two specific aspects 
of historical context that are the focus of the present research namely, the process of 
lexical entrainment and lexical differentiation. 
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Lexical Entrainment and Lexical Differentiation 
In a classic experiment, Brennan and Clark (1996) asked speakers to describe one 
of multiple objects from a given category (e.g., one of three fish) to an addressee. 
Through conversational grounding processes (Clark & Schaefer, 1989), partners 
developed specific, entrained terms (e.g., the curved round fish) to distinguish among the 
category exemplars. Interestingly, when the local context changed to include only a 
single category exemplar, speakers tended to continue to use the previous entrained 
expressions even though they overspecified the referent given the immediate context 
(e.g., speakers continued to say the curved round fish, despite the fact that the fish would 
have uniquely identified the referent). This overmodification pattern was large (it 
occurred at a rate of 25-81%, depending on the number of times and the contexts in 
which the speaker had previously referred to the object), suggesting that the historical 
context was powerful enough to override local informativity expectations.  
There are at least two mechanisms which could support the sensitivity to 
historical context. One mechanism, suggested by Brennan and Clark (1996), is that the 
speakers agreed on a name or conceptual pact for how to refer to the entity (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996). On this account, conversational partners learn shared names for entities 
they repeatedly refer to, and historical context effects emerge because speakers re-use 
these learned names when speaking with their same partner (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 
1992; Schober & Clark, 1989). Thus, the aspect of the historical discourse record that 
guides reference is knowledge of how a current referent was previously referred to with 
the current partner. While the evidence for these shared names or conceptual pacts is 
	   6	  
clear, an open question is whether speakers design expressions with respect to other 
aspects of the historical context, such how different entities were previously referred to.  
If speakers do take into consideration how different entities were referred to when 
designing subsequent expressions, this would suggest that referential processes consider 
an even broader view of the historical record. Thus an alternative, but non-mutually 
exclusive explanation for Brennan & Clark’s finding is that conversational partners 
encode information about each of the entities in the historical context, and subsequently 
design referring expressions with respect to all of the entities in both the local and 
historical context. On this alternative, context-memory view, a speaker might persist in 
calling a given fish the curved round fish in a context with a single fish, because the 
relevant context included both that single fish, as well as other previously-referred to fish. 
Importantly, such a view is not incompatible with Brennan and Clark’s (1996) proposal 
that partners form conceptual pacts. Instead, the context-memory view would claim that 
in addition to using entrained terms, speakers design referential expressions to contrast 
with descriptions of previous referents, even when those referents are not present in the 
immediate context. 
Is there any evidence that referents from previous contexts guide subsequent 
referring? According to the principle of pre-emption by homonymy, a well-established 
term preempts the use of the same term to signify a new meaning (Clark & Clark, 1979; 
while these principles were originally applied to denominal verbs, they clearly extend to 
nouns; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007). According to this principle, 
once interlocutors arrive at an entrained term for a given entity, that term should not be 
used to refer to anything but the original referent. Van Der Wege (2009) identified a 
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related phenomenon in the production of referring expressions, and termed it lexical 
differentiation. In her experiment, participants described a series of objects in contexts 
with one typical exemplar and one atypical exemplar of a given category (e.g., a tree with 
leaves and a tree without leaves). To test for differentiation, speakers first established an 
entrained term to refer to a unique referent (e.g., a tree in a context that did not contain 
other trees was referred to as the tree) and then subsequently described a different unique 
referent from the same basic level object category (e.g., a tree without leaves in a context 
that did not contain other trees). Speakers in live conversation were significantly more 
likely to describe the second object with a more specific referential expression that only 
applied to the current target (e.g., the tree without leaves), even though a basic level noun 
would have been sufficient for the immediate context (note that the results were slightly 
different in non-conversational settings).  
 This lexical differentiation finding is consistent with the context-memory view 
because it shows that speakers take into consideration how referents from the discourse 
history were previously described when designing new expressions. However, a 
complication of these findings is that the lexical differentiation phenomenon was strongly 
influenced by stimulus type and order: When participants were exposed to the typical 
item first and then the atypical item later, the percentage of precise reference phrases 
increased from 7% for typical items to 62% for atypical items, which is consistent with a 
large lexical differentiation effect. However, when speakers were exposed to atypical 
items first, the percentage of precise reference phrases decreased from 43% for the 
atypical item to 40% when later referring to the typical item from the same category. 
While it is the case that within a category speakers were grew more precise from the first 
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to the second phase (typical: 7% to 40%; atypical: 43% to 62%), it is unclear to what 
extent the differentiation effect was driven by the contrast in typicality between the two 
pairs. Thus, while these findings do show that speakers consider the broader historical 
context (and not just the entrained name for the current referent), an open question is 
whether this effect is limited to contrasts with atypical category exemplars, or whether it 
would generalize to contrasting pairs of typical referents.  
 
Historical and Immediate contexts in language comprehension 
 The studies by Brennan and Clark (1996) and Van Der Wege (2009) focused on 
the process of language production, and found that speakers tend to maintain precedents 
they established with their conversational partners. We now turn to the question of the 
addressee’s expectations of the speaker. Do addressees expect speakers to use established 
precedents even when the local context changes?  
The existing research, while limited, suggests that addressees do expect speakers 
to maintain referential precedents even in situations in which the precedent would 
overspecify the referent for the current display. Barr and Keysar (2002) presented 
listeners with a series of pictures and auditory recordings that instructed them to click on 
one of two pictures in a display. In the baseline phase of the experiment, listeners 
interpreted basic level nouns such as “car” in contexts including, e.g., a sportscar and a 
carnation. Following this baseline, the same objects were referred to using subordinate 
level nouns, such as “carnation” in the context of a daisy and a carnation, or “sportscar” 
in the context of a station wagon and a sports car. A final set of post-test trials were 
identical to the pre-test, and included two objects from different categories with entrained 
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subordinate labels (e.g., a sportscar and a carnation). Critically, the stimuli were designed 
such that the onset of the basic level term “car” phonologically overlapped the 
subordinate level noun “carnation” (i.e., they were cohort competitors, Allopenna, et al., 
1998). When interpreting car, listeners fixated the subordinate term (e.g., carnation) 
more at the post-test compared to the pre-test, even though the immediate context did not 
necessitate the subordinate term in either case. However, this entrainment effect did not 
override the expectation for a basic level term: Even after training, listeners still fixated 
the basic-level target “car” more than the subordinate-level competitor “carnation”. 
Further, because this entrainment effect relied on a pre-test vs. post-test comparison, it is 
unclear if the increase in “carnation” fixations at post-test was due to learning of the 
entrained name, or because participants had clicked on the carnation multiple times 
during entrainment. 
 While the experiment by Barr and Keysar (2002) provides initial evidence that 
listeners maintain expectations for entrained terms across contextual changes, what is not 
known is whether interpretation processes are sensitive to other aspects of the historical 
context, such as how other, non-present objects were referred to. This is the focus of the 
present research. Specifically, we ask whether historical conversational precedents for 
how previous, non-present discourse referents can override quantity expectations (Grice, 
1975), and thus render a locally overspecified, but unentrained referential expression 
felicitous.  
In three experiments, we examined the question of whether historical expectations 
can override quantity violations by examining the process of lexical differentiation (Van 
Der Wege, 2009) and the scope of contexts that afford overmodification. Experiment 1 
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was designed to test for lexical differentiation in language production for reference to 
typical category exemplars. In Experiments 2-3, we examined whether addressees 
generate lexical differentiation expectations, focusing on the interpretation of 
differentiation in modified expressions (Experiment 2), and in subordinate nouns 
(Experiment 3).   
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1  
 The lexical differentiation results reported by Van Der Wege (2009) suggest that 
the scope of relevant historical context might be quite broad. Recall that speakers tended 
to use a more precise term when describing a new exemplar from a previously-described 
category (e.g., the tree…. the tree without leaves), but that the differentiation effect was 
largely driven by trials on which speakers first described a typical item (e.g., leafy tree) 
and then later described an atypical item (e.g., tree without leaves). Here we test the 
generalizability of these findings by testing for the differentiation effect in situations 
where speakers described two typical exemplars from the same category.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixteen undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
participated in the experiment as speakers in return for partial course credit or either cash 
payment ($8). Participants were native speakers of North American English.  
 
Procedure 
 A participant and an experimenter played a version of a referential 
communication task (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966) while sitting at separate computers in 
the same room. On each trial, the participant and the experimenter viewed a computer 
screen with four pictures, and the participant gave the experimenter an instruction aloud 
to click on one of four objects. The experimenter followed the participant’s instructions 
on her own screen. Recordings of the participant’s voice were saved directly to disk. The 
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target object was indicated to the participant with a black box (see Figure 1). Participants 
were allowed to describe the target object in any way they saw fit except for using 
locative phrases (locatives, e.g., the top left one, instead of the shirt, were disallowed 
because they would not have set up the critical preconditions for differentiation, whereby 
the basic level object name for the target object was already used for another object). On 
the experimenter’s screen, the target was not indicated. The task was interactive and the 
experimenter asked questions for clarification as needed (this was uncommon). The 
experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes. 
 
	  
Figures 1.  Experiment 1:  Example stimuli from entrainment trials (left) and test trials 
(right). The target is indicated to the speaker by the black rectangle. This example shows 
the “contrast” condition; in the “no-contrast” condition, the target during entrainment 
would be an unrelated item such as a towel.  
 
Materials 
 Each participant completed a total of 448 trials including 32 target trials, 192 
entrainment trials and 224 filler trials (see Figure 2). Experiment 1 consisted of two 
phases: entrainment and test. In entrainment trials, participants described either the 
contrast object (e.g., checkered shirt) or an unrelated object (e.g., towel) six times to 
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establish entrained terms. Following entrainment, test displays had four new objects, 
including a target object and three unrelated objects. The target was a second exemplar of 
the same category (e.g., striped shirt) as the contrast. Filler trials contained two 
contrasting objects from the same category (e.g., two fish) and two unrelated objects. On 
half of the filler trials, the target was one of two contrast objects and on the other half, the 
target was one of two unrelated objects. Filler trials with contrasting objects were 
included so that speakers would sometimes need to produce modified noun phrases. 
Entrainment and test trials for the different item sets were interspersed with filler trials in 
a pseudo-random order such that from the participant’s point of view, there was no 
distinction between the trial types, and so that all 7 trials associated with a single item set 
(6 entrainment, 1 test) occurred within a span of at most 100 trials.  
The primary manipulation was whether speakers had previously described the 
contrast object or not, and was manipulated within-subjects. In the contrast condition, 
participants described the contrast object (e.g., checkered shirt) in entrainment trials and 
then described the target object (e.g., striped shirt) at test. In the non-contrast condition, 
participants described an unrelated object (e.g., towel) in entrainment, and then described 
the target object (e.g., striped shirt) at test. Note that for items in the non-contrast 
condition, speakers never saw the contrast object.  
 There were a total of 288 visual stimuli, all of which were pictures of every-day 
objects. The stimuli included the 32 triplets of target (e.g., checkered shirt), contrast (e.g., 
striped shirt), and unrelated items (e.g., towel) that were used as critical items in the 
contrast and no-contrast conditions. The remaining visual stimuli were used on filler 
trials and included 32 triplets contrasting objects (e.g., opened box, wrapped box, stacked 
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box) and 64 pairs of contrasting objects (e.g., sitting dog, jumping dog) from the same 
categories. For filler object triplets, two of the pictures were presented together on filler 
entrainment trials and the third was subsequently presented alone at test. For filler object 
pairs, the two objects were presented on separate trials during entrainment and test. The 
filler trials were designed to create the necessary conditions such that on target trials all 
four objects were novel—that is, the speaker had not seen or described them before—
whereas each of the four objects came from a category that was familiar to participants 
(see illustration in Figure 2). All items were counterbalanced across conditions across 
two lists. Each participant completed the items in one list. 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of how entrainment trials established the necessary pre-conditions 
for lexical differentiation in Experiments 1 and 2. Upper row: example targets on (four 
different) entrainment trials. During entrainment, the striped shirt, jumping dog, and 
white bread would be presented on separate trials, and the two boxes would be presented 
on the same trial. Bottom row: target trials contained four new exemplars of previously-
experienced categories. In this example, the four (previously unseen) images in the 
bottom row would be arranged on a single target trial as shown in Figure 1(right). 
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Predictions 
 If previous reports of lexical differentiation were restricted to atypical category 
exemplars, speakers should not be sensitive to historical context and instead describe the 
target with respect to the current display. Thus we would expect speakers to use bare 
noun phrases both in entrainment and target trials. However, if speakers do lexically 
differentiate typical exemplars, we would expect speakers to use bare nouns to refer to 
target objects in entrainment trials, and more specific (differentiated) expressions on 
target trials. 
Analysis and Results 
 The recordings of the speakers’ productions were transcribed and coded for 
whether they used a bare noun phrase or a modified noun phrase. In listening to the 
recordings, we noticed that in some cases speakers alternated from one noun to another 
noun when describing the contrast object and then the target. For example, if they first 
referred to the contrast object in entrainment trials as the knife, in the test trials, speakers 
sometimes used a different noun, such as the sword, to refer to the target. This finding 
suggests that speakers may differentiate using multiple mechanisms and in some cases 
prefer an alternate, unmodified term.  
In the non-contrast condition, on test trials speakers typically referred to the target 
with a bare noun phrase (89.9%), and used a modified noun phrase on only 10.1% of 
trials. In the contrast condition, on target trials speakers used modified noun phrases on 
17.6% of trials, and noun phrases that were different than the ones used to refer to the 
contrast during entrainment on 16.4% of trials (e.g., knife → sword). While bare noun 
phrases were common in the contrast condition (66%), the percentage was substantially 
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lower compared to the non-contrast condition (see Table 1). Thus, we found that speakers 
lexically differentiate using two mechanisms; modified noun phrases and different bare 
noun phrases. Note that it was not possible to measure the rate at which different noun 
phrases were used in the non-contrast condition because target object categories were 
only named once. 
 
Table 1. Percentage (SE) of each noun phrase type on test trials in Experiment 1.  
 
Bare noun phrase 
(e.g., knife) 
Modified noun phrase 
(e.g., fancy knife) 
Different bare noun phrase 
(e.g., knife/sword) 
Non-contrast 89.9% (11.05) 10.1% (11.15) NA 
Contrast 66% (18.81) 17.6% (7.26) 16.4% (6.83) 
 
 We analyzed the data in a logistic mixed effects model with contrast condition as 
a fixed effect, and subjects and items as crossed random intercepts (see Table 2). The 
dependent variable was whether the speaker used a modifier or not (note that this metric 
does not capture differentiation using a different bare noun). Evaluation of AIC (Akaike, 
1974) and the deviance test statistic indicated that adding random slopes for the condition 
effect did not improve model fit. This model revealed a main effect of contrast (z=2.81, 
p<.01): Speakers were more likely to use modifiers when they had previously referred to 
contrast objects (contrast condition) compared to situations where they had not (non-
contrast condition).  
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 Table 2. Mixed effect model with contrast (contrast vs. no contrast) as a fixed effect in Exp1. 
 
In summary, the present findings replicate and extend Van Der Wege (2009), 
demonstrating lexical differentiation in situations where speakers are sequentially 
describe two typical exemplars of the same category. Our findings bear resemblance to 
other findings that speakers are more likely to avoid homophonic ambiguity when they 
have previously referred to another item (e.g., referring to a baseball bat as “bat” reduces 
subsequent likelihood of using “bat” to refer to a flying mammal bat; Ferreira, Slevc, & 
Rogers, 2005). More generally, our results suggest that when speakers design their 
referential expressions, they take into account the previous discourse record, even in 
situations where the local context has changed.  
The fact that speakers themselves had previously referred to the contrast object 
may be a key contributor to their resistance to re-use the critical term for a different 
referent. Upon viewing the target referent on test trials, the similarity of the production 
experience to the contrast trials (i.e., describing a different shirt) may evoke the 
appropriate conditions to elicit differentiation. An open question, then, is whether lexical 
differentiation would extend to language comprehension. In Experiments 2-3, we address 
this question by examining whether addressees expect speakers to lexically differentiate. 
We examine the two mechanisms speakers used to differentiate separately, focusing on 
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|) 
(a) overall     
Fixed effects     
(intercept) -2.7370 0.4005 -6.834 8.28e-12 
Contrast 0.8626 0.3067 2.813 0.00491 
  Variance Std.Dev. 
Random effects    
Groups    
  Subject (Intercept) 0.97742 0.98865 
  Item (Intercept) 2.06136 1.43574 
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interpretation of modified noun phrases in Experiment 2 and different noun phrases in 
Experiment 3. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2  
The lexical differentiation effect in Experiment 1 sets the stage for the 
investigation of lexical differentiation during language comprehension in Experiment 2. 
Specifically, we ask whether addressees expect speakers to lexically differentiate their 
expressions, even when it would result in local overspecification.  
According to the historical view of conversation, the relevant discourse record is 
broad. It leads speakers to maintain entrained precedents (Brennan & Clark, 1996), and 
lexically differentiate current expressions from previously used expressions (Van Der 
Wege, 2009). In both cases, entrainment and differentiation result in expressions that are 
appropriately modified with respect to the historical discourse record, but overmodified 
or too specific (in the case of subordinate terms) for the immediate context. Given that 
overmodification can be confusing for the listener (Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006; 
Engelhardt, Demiral, & Ferreira, 2011), one might expect that comprehension could be 
facilitated if listeners took a similarly broad view of the discourse record, within which, 
such locally overmodified expressions would be appropriately informative. 
Further, if, as some have claimed, language production and comprehension draw 
on the same processes (Pickering & Garrod, 2004, in press; Pickering & Branigan, 1998), 
the scope of relevant discourse history should be the same in comprehension and 
production, particularly in interactive conversation where interlocutors are thought to 
prime one another at multiple levels of representation, including common ground 
(Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Indeed, some evidence suggests that listeners do take a 
historical view of the discourse record. For example, listeners show facilitated 
interpretation of previously entrained referential terms (Metzing & Brennan, 2003; 
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Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Kronmuller & Barr, 2007), and show 
competition from previously entrained terms even when the local referential context does 
not require them (Barr & Keysar, 2002). However, these experiments examined situations 
in which the speaker and listener had established a term for a particular referent and then 
tested whether the listener expected the speaker to continue using that expression for the 
very same referent. While these findings offer insight into the learned mappings between 
specific referents and names, they say less about the scope of the relevant discourse 
context per se. Indeed, according to some accounts, learned associations between 
expressions, referents and discourse partners reflect a type of associative priming 
(Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005). On such a view, these entrainment effects are 
prompted by the referent, and offer little insight into whether listeners bring to mind 
contextual entities from previous joint experience when interpreting referential 
expressions.  
If the lexical differentiation phenomenon did extend to language comprehension, 
it would likely require the listener to recall past discourse contexts, and generate an 
expectation that the speaker would contrast current referents with previous referents. 
Unlike entrainment, such a process would require memory for multiple items in the 
discourse context, as after all, there is no way of predicting which of the previous context 
objects would be contrasted in future trials. 
In order to test the hypothesis that listeners generate lexical differentiation 
predictions during comprehension, we compared language production and 
comprehension processes in two situations: one in which the conversational history 
supports lexical differentiation (i.e., the basic level object term which would ordinarily be 
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used to refer to the current referent was previously used to refer to different exemplar 
from same category), and one in which it does not (i.e., the basic level object term which 
would ordinarily be used to refer to the current referent was not previously used in the 
discourse). If a speaker’s previous use of a basic level object term to refer to one category 
exemplar results in an expectation for differentiation when referring to other members of 
the same category, we should observe differentiation-based expectations when the 
conversational history includes a previous use of that basic level term. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-two undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
participated in the experiment as listeners in return for either cash ($8) or partial course 
credit. Participants were native speakers of North American English and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal hearing and vision. None of the participants in Experiment 2 had 
previously participated in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
 A participant and an experimenter sat at separate computers facing each other. 
Across participants, a total of 5 native English-speaking lab assistants (two female) 
played the role of experimenter. Lab assistants were unaware of the specific experimental 
predictions. Each trial began with a fixation cross for 1000ms, then the cross disappeared 
and 4 different objects appeared on the screen. On each trial, the experimenter’s screen 
showed the same four objects as the participant’s screen, as well as a text prompt 
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indicating what the critical instruction was for that trial (the computer screens were 
positioned such that the participant was unaware of the text prompts). Once the pictures 
appeared on their respective computer screens, participants followed the experimenter’s 
instructions to manipulate one of the four objects (e.g., “Click on the shirt."). While this 
instruction was scripted, the participant and experimenter were free to otherwise 
converse. Thus, if the instructions were not clear enough, participants were encouraged to 
ask for clarification (this was uncommon).  
 The participants’ eye movements were monitored during the experiment with an 
Eyelink 1000 desktop mounted eye tracker. It sampled eye movements monocularly at 
1000hz and recorded them to disk. The experimenter wore a headset microphone and 
their voice was recorded directly to disk. The experiment lasted approximately 50 
minutes. 
 
Materials 
 Each participant completed a total of 448 trials including 32 target trials, 192 
entrainment trials and 224 filler trials (See Figure 3). As in Experiment 1, this experiment 
consisted of two phases: entrainment trials and test trials. Filler trials were randomly 
intermixed between these two phases. In entrainment trials, participants were exposed to 
the contrast object (e.g., checkered shirt) in the context of three unrelated objects six 
times. The contrast and the three unrelated objects were equally likely to be referred to 
during entrainment. Following entrainment, test trials presented the target object and 
three unrelated objects. As in Experiment 1, all four objects on the test trial were new 
(i.e., they had not been seen before in the experiment), but the categories of all four 
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objects were familiar. Test instructions were equally likely to refer to the target (critical 
trials) as one of the three unrelated objects (filler trials). 
 
 
Figure 3. Example stimuli for Experiment 2. 
 
There were total of 7 trials per target item (e.g., “shirt”): 6 entrainment trials and 1 
target trial. All trials associated with one target item, from the first entrainment trials to 
the target trial, occurred within at most 120 trials. Filler trials always presented two 
contrast objects from the same category (e.g., two birds) and two unrelated objects. On 
half of the filler trials, the instructions referred to one of the contrasting objects using a 
modified noun phrase and on the other half of filler trials, instructions with bare noun 
phrases were given. There were a total of 288 visual stimuli. All stimuli were color 
photographs of every-day objects. The 32 pairs of target and competitor objects were 
identical to the critical pairs used in Experiment 1 (e.g., striped shirt and checkered shirt). 
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The remaining stimuli were fillers, and like the target and competitor objects, were 
organized into sets. The filler sets were of two types: triplets of contrasting objects (e.g., 
opened box, wrapped box, stacked box) and pairs of contrasting objects (e.g., sitting dog, 
jumping dog). These filler stimuli were identical to those presented in Experiment 1 (see 
Figure 2). Contrast sets (e.g., two boxes or two dogs) were never displayed on the same 
screen except for on filler trials. 
In order to test for lexical differentiation in language comprehension, two factors 
were manipulated within-subjects: The first factor was whether the basic level object 
term for the target object (e.g., shirt) was previously used to refer to a different token 
from the same category during entrainment (historical condition), or not (ahistorical 
condition). In the historical condition, during entrainment, the experimenter consistently 
described the contrast object with the critical basic level term (e.g., Click on the shirt). In 
the ahistorical condition, during entrainment the experimenter referred to the contrast 
using a locative phrase (e.g., Click on the bottom right object). Importantly, the use of a 
locative in the ahistorical condition allows us to control for the fact that the contrast 
object was referred to and was clicked on by the subject, without producing the necessary 
preconditions for lexical differentiation. The fact that addressees interpreted an 
instruction to click on the contrast object in this control condition is essential because this 
would allow us to attribute any interpretation benefit in the historical condition at test, to 
the fact that the listener expected the speaker to differentiation the target expression, and 
not because the listener has more experience clicking on objects from that category. 
The second factor was whether the test instruction differentiated the target object 
from the previously-experienced contrast object using a modified noun phrase (e.g., Click 
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on the striped shirt), or not (e.g., Click on the shirt). Note that the modified noun phrase 
was over informative for the current target display, but appropriately informative given 
the historical context. The critical expressions on test trials were designed following the 
production patterns in Experiment 1 (recall that the same test images were used), such 
that the most popular noun used to describe each target images in Experiment 1 was used 
as the critical noun on test trials in Experiment 2.  
The 32 target trials were rotated through the four conditions across four 
experimental lists. Each participant saw the materials in one list.  
 
Predictions 
If language production and comprehension use similar, historical representations 
of the discourse (Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Pickering & Branigan, 1998; Brennan & 
Clark, 1996), then listeners in Experiment 2 should show evidence of lexical 
differentiation-based expectations. If so, interpretation of the modified noun phrase (e.g., 
the striped shirt) should be significantly facilitated in the historical, compared to the 
ahistorical condition, because the listener would be more likely to expect a differentiated, 
modified expression in the historical condition compared to the ahistorical condition. In 
the absence of an expectation for differentiation (ahistorical condition), the modifier 
would be an unnecessary, and likely to result in comprehension difficulty (e.g., 
Engelhardt, et al., 2006; Engelhardt, et al., 2011).  
A different pattern of results is predicted for the non-modified expressions. When 
interpreting non-modified expressions on test trials (e.g., the shirt), interpretation of the 
bare noun phrase should be facilitated in the ahistorical condition because listeners would 
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be more likely to expect an unmodified (non-differentiated) expression. In fact, if 
listeners in the historical condition strongly expect a modifier, they might make fewer 
target fixations when interpreting non-modified expressions than in the ahistorical 
condition, due to the mismatch between their expectation and the unmodified expression.  
In contrast, if listeners do not generate a lexical differentiation expectation, we 
would expect an early benefit for the historical condition that is the same for modified 
and non-modified expressions, due to the previous exposure to the target noun in the 
historical condition (i.e. a priming effect).  
 
Analysis and Results 
We first analyzed the recorded instructions to determine whether there were 
differences in prosodic form across conditions. Because all instructions were naturally 
produced live in the context of an experiment, potential differences in prosodic form 
across conditions could make it difficult to tease apart effects of historical experience 
from effects of prosody. All instructions produced by the experimenter were transcribed 
and the critical adjective and noun were identified in Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2003). 
The prosodic properties of pitch (minimum, maximum and average), intensity and 
duration of the critical adjective and noun were analyzed. There were no significant 
differences in any prosodic properties across conditions (t’s<1.00).  
 We now turn to our primary analysis, which focuses on the eye movements that 
listeners made as they interpreted the experimenter’s descriptions on target trials. The 
pattern of eye movements on target trials was considerably different depending on 
whether the participant heard a modified or a non-modified instruction as, after all, the 
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modifier provided unique information about the target prior to the noun (e.g., Sedivy, et 
al., 1999). As a result, our planned comparisons analyzed modified and non-modified 
noun phrases separately (see Figures 4-5).   
 
 
Figure 4. The proportion of target fixations following noun onset for non-modified 
instructions in Experiment 2. 	  
 
Figure 5. The proportion of target fixations following noun onset for modified 
instructions in Experiment 2. 
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Non-modified expressions 
Fixations to the target started to increase approximately 200-300ms following 
noun onset. Contrary to predictions, when listeners had previously interpreted the non-
modified expression as referring to the contrast object (historical condition), there was no 
penalty for subsequently interpreting a non-modified reference to the target using the 
same term. Eye movements for non-modified expressions were analyzed in two 500ms 
analysis regions (see Table 3); regions were planned in advance to capture early and late 
comprehension effects. The first 500ms time-window was from 100ms to 600ms after 
noun onset and the second was from 600ms to 1100ms after noun onset. The first window 
was offset by 100ms given that it takes some time to program and launch an eye 
movement (see Altmann, 2011; Hallet, 1986).  
We analyzed the proportion of fixations to the target in a series of mixed effects 
models with time-window and historical condition as fixed effects, coded with orthogonal 
contrast codes (see Table 3).  
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Table 3. Mixed effect model with time-window and historical condition as fixed effects for non-modified expression in Exp2. 
The dependent measure is the proportion of fixations to the target object. 
 Estimate SE t-value pMCM
C 
  Variance Std.Dev. 
(a) overall         
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 11.1525 0.5017 22.228 0.0001     
Window 8.2602 0.5103 16.187 0.0001   Subject (Intercept) 1.2661 1.1252 
Entrainment 1.9062 0.7237 2.634 0.0080   Trial (Intercept) 2.5393 1.5935 
Window*Entrainment -3.8555 1.0207 -3.777 0.0001   Residual  60.5477 7.7812 
(b) 100-600ms         
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 11.0753 0.6366 17.399 0.001     
Entrainment 1.8954 0.7371 2.571 0.008   Subject (Intercept) 5.7116 2.3899 
       Trial (Intercept) 2.8304 1.6824 
       Residual  62.4290 7.9012 
(c) 600-1100ms         
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 19.4624 0.5051 38.53 0.001     
Entrainment -1.9654 0.6810 -2.89 0.006   Subject (Intercept) 0.60332 0.77674 
       Trial (Intercept) 3.75454 1.93766 
       Residual  53.52448 7.31604 
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Table 4. Mixed effect model with time-window and historical factor as fixed effects for modified expressions in Exp2. 
The dependent measure is the proportion of fixations to the target object. 
 Estimate SE t-value pMCMC   Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 10.7931 0.4809 22.442 0.0001     
Window 3.6801 0.2804 13.123 0.0001   Subject (Intercept) 1.3598 1.1661 
Entrainment 0.9861 0.7241 1.362 0.1772   Trial (Intercept) 1.8481 1.3595 
Window*Entrainment -0.5664 0.5609 -1.010 0.3136   Residual  79.9009 8.9387 
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The dependent measure was the proportion of target fixations within the time-
window. Backwards evaluation of AIC (Akaike, 1974) and the deviance test statistic 
indicated that models with random slopes for the fixed effects did not improve model fit. 
In this and all subsequent analyses, we report the critical t-statistic along with a Monte 
Carol Markov Chain (MCMC) based p-value estimate, which provides a more 
conservative estimate of the significance level than would be obtained from using the 
degrees of freedom associated with the test statistic (see Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 
2008; Barr, 2008). The first model included time-window and entrainment type as factors 
and revealed two main effects and a significant interaction. To explore the interaction, 
two planned analyses focused on the effects at the first and second time-window 
separately. 
During the first analysis window (100-600ms after the onset of the unmodified 
noun), participants fixated the target more often in the historical than the ahistorical 
condition (p<.01). This result suggests that if listeners did generate a lexical 
differentiation expectation, it did not affect interpretation of an expression that was 
appropriately modified for the immediate context. Instead, there appeared to be a small 
benefit for previous experience with the target noun. In the second time-window (600-
1100ms following noun onset), the pattern of fixations flipped, with a larger proportion 
of fixations to the target in the ahistorical condition (p<.01). The flip in the direction of 
the effect is likely due to delays in target identification (e.g., see Brown-Schmidt, 2009), 
as the average target fixation latency was (non-significantly) delayed in the ahistorical 
(m=412ms, SD=282) compared to the historical condition (m=389ms, SD=311ms). The 
locus of the effect may be priming of the critical noun (Ferreira, Kleinman, Kraljic, & 
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Siu, 2012), as critical nouns in the historical condition were repeatedly interpreted during 
entrainment, whereas for items in the ahistorical condition, participants were never 
exposed to the target noun prior to the critical trial.  
 
Modified expressions 
 Eye movements in response to modified expressions were analyzed in three 
planned time-windows. The first time-window was from 100ms after adjective onset to 
the average noun onset time (483ms following adjective onset), and captured fixations in 
response to the critical adjective. The second window was from noun onset to 500ms 
after noun onset, and captured fixations in response to the noun. The final window was 
from 500ms to 1000ms after noun onset, and was selected to capture late effects. We 
analyzed the proportion of fixations to the target in a series of mixed effects models with 
time-window and historical condition as fixed effects (see Table 4). As in the model for 
non-modified expressions, fixed effects were coded using orthogonal contrast codes and 
random slopes did not improve model fit. The first model included time-window and 
entrainment type as factors and revealed a main effect of time-window only, due to an 
increase in target fixations over the trial.  
If listeners expected the speaker to lexically differentiate, we would expect more 
target fixations in the historical vs. the ahistorical condition. However, neither the effect 
of entrainment, nor the interaction with time was significant. Further, separate planned 
analyses at each time-window showed no evidence of a historical context effect (ps>.05). 
This result suggests that listeners did not generate an expectation for lexical 
differentiation when sequentially interpreting reference to two different exemplars of 
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same category. The fact that the results in comprehension are in contrast with the 
production findings of Experiment 1 and Van Der Wege (2009) suggests that the scope of 
relevant discourse history may be different in comprehension and production.  
 
Relationship between production and comprehension 
The lack of a differentiation effect in Experiment 2 suggests that listeners strongly 
expected to hear basic level names to refer to the target referent. Indeed, while speakers 
in Experiment 1 showed significant differentiation effects, they repeated basic level terms 
on over half of the differentiation trials. Perhaps, then, speakers and listeners alike are 
reluctant to deviate from using a basic name, particularly for referents with well-
established names. To examine this possibility, a post-hoc analysis was conducted to 
examine if the consistency with which targets were named in Experiment 1 predicted the 
strength of the differentiation prediction in Experiment 2. We calculated the number of 
nouns that were used by speakers in Experiment 1 to refer to each target object across all 
participants, for both the contrast (where differentiation is expected) and no-contrast 
(where differentiation is not expected) conditions. If participants were consistent in how 
they named targets, name agreement would be 100%; if participants were inconsistent, 
the percent agreeing on a single noun might be lower. The name agreement rates in 
Experiment 1 ranged from 56.25% to 100% (total: M = 87.89, SD = 13.65; contrast 
condition: M = 87.89, SD = 15.71, no-contrast condition: M = 88.28, SD = 15.53), 
suggesting substantial variability in the participant’s impression about basic level nouns. 
We analyzed the proportion of fixations to the target in a mixed effects model with name 
agreement (from Experiment 1), time-window, and entrainment as fixed effects when 
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participants heard modified noun phrases in Experiment 2. Subject and item were 
included as random intercepts; random slopes did not improve model fit. The analysis 
revealed significant effects of both name agreement (p<0.05) and time-window (p<0.01); 
neither the effect of entrainment, nor the interaction with name agreement was 
significant. The naming agreement effect was due to a decrease in target fixations with 
increasing naming agreement. This result suggests that locally overinformative modifiers 
may be particularly dispreferred when an object’s name is highly predictable. However, 
the lack of an interaction with the entrainment effect suggests that high name agreement 
was not to blame for a failure to generate differentiation expectations. 
In summary, the results of Experiment 2 offered no evidence that listeners 
generate lexical differentiation expectations. Instead, both modified and non-modified 
nouns were interpreted equally rapidly, regardless of the historical context. However, an 
outstanding possibility is that listeners in Experiment 2 did expect speakers to lexically 
differentiate, but that they were unable to make a specific enough prediction about the 
form of the differentiated, modified expression in order to guide comprehension. 
Consider that if listeners did expect speakers to use a more specific expression, several 
different modifiers, or alternative subordinate nouns could have been used and thus 
perhaps listeners could not make a useful prediction (for a related discussion, see 
Federmeier, Wlotko, De Ochoa-Dewald, & Kutas, 2007; Federmeier, 2007; Hoeks, 
Stowe, & Doedens, 2004). For example, when listeners in the historical condition saw the 
striped shirt at test, they might have successfully contrasted this item with their historical 
representation of the checkered shirt, and the fact that the contrast was referred to as the 
shirt. However, to gain a processing benefit, the listener would have had to anticipate the 
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critical expression the striped shirt, and not dress shirt, pinstripe shirt, or tailored shirt. If 
the addressee predicted the wrong differentiated term, they would not show any benefit 
when interpreting the striped shirt, due to the mismatch between their expectation and the 
current input.  
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 3  
In Experiment 3, we test for differentiation effects in comprehension again, but in 
a paradigm where the differentiation prediction should be easier to make. Recall that the 
results of Experiment 1 showed that speakers used two mechanisms to differentiate their 
expressions: modification and the use of a different noun. In Experiment 3 we asked 
whether listeners expected speakers to differentiate using a different, subordinate-level 
nouns, which might be easier to make predictions about compared to the modified 
expressions that we tested in Experiment 2.  
The critical stimuli in this experiment were unmodified noun phrases such as the 
poodle, or the dock. We used a cohort-competitor paradigm (Allopenna, Magnuson, & 
Tanenhaus, 1998; Barr & Keysar, 2002), which allowed us to test for competition 
between temporary cohort competitors such as poodle and pool, and dock and dog. As in 
Experiment 2, participants completed both entrainment and test trials. During 
entrainment, listeners interpreted basic level nouns such as the dog (as referring to, e.g., a 
German Shepard). Test scenes included a second exemplar from the same object category 
(e.g., a poodle), a subordinate-level cohort competitor (pool), a basic-level cohort 
competitor (dock, where dock and the basic-level term dog are cohort competitors), and 
an unrelated item (racquet). When interpreting the subordinate term poodle, which is 
temporarily ambiguous with the basic-level term pool, listeners should be more likely to 
interpret the temporarily ambiguous phoneme sequence poo- as referring to the 
subordinate-level name (poodle) if they expected the speaker to lexically differentiate. 
When interpreting dock, which is temporarily ambiguous with the basic-level term dog, 
listeners should be more likely to interpret the initial ambiguous phonemes do- as 
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referring to the dock if they expected the speaker would have referred to the dog using a 
differentiated term (such as poodle).  
 Importantly, by including a competitor during test trials, Experiment 3 offers a 
stronger test of lexical differentiation effects, because test scenes contain referents 
temporarily consistent with both the differentiation, and non-differentiation interpretation 
(see Barr & Keysar, 2002 for a similar approach). Thus, if listeners in Experiment 2 did 
in fact generate lexical differentiation expectations, but failed to predict the specific 
modifier that the speaker used, in Experiment 3 the pattern of cohort competition during 
the interpretation of subordinate (e.g., poodle), and basic level competitors (e.g., pool) 
should reveal the differentiation-based expectations. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-two undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
participated in the experiment as speakers in return for partial course credit or either cash 
($8). Participants were native speakers of North American English. No participant took 
part in Experiments 1 or 2.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
 As in Experiment 2, a participant and an experimenter played a version of a 
referential communication task. The procedure of Experiment 3 was identical to 
Experiment 2. Across a series of trials, the experimenter gave instructions to the 
participant to click one of the four objects on the screen. The participant’s eye 
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movements were monitored and the experimenter’s voice was recorded during the 
experiment.  
 Each participant completed a total of 256 trials including 16 target trials, 96 
entrainment trials and 144 filler trials. Like Experiment 2, there were two phases: 
entrainment trials and test trials. During the entrainment trials, participants were shown to 
the contrast object (e.g., dog) with three unrelated objects six times. The experimenter 
gave instructions referring the contrast object or one of the unrelated objects using a bare 
noun phrase (e.g., Click on the dog). 
 
 
Figure 6. Example stimuli for Experiment 3. 
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 During test trials each display contained four objects: the subordinate-level object 
(e.g., poodle/dog), two potential cohort competitor objects (e.g., pool and dock), and an 
unrelated object (e.g., racquet). Of the two potential cohort competitor objects, one (e.g., 
dock) was a cohort competitor with the basic-level noun (e.g., dog) and the other was a 
cohort (e.g., pool) with the subordinate-level noun (e.g., poodle). Among the 16 test 
trials, the target was a subordinate-level object for the half of trials (e.g., poodle) and for 
the other half trials, the target was a cohort object (e.g., dock). Target trials never used 
the basic-level term for the subordinate-level object (e.g., the term dog was never used to 
refer to the poodle). 
 Two factors were manipulated within-subjects: Entrainment type (historical or 
ahistorical) and target type (subordinate level object or cohort object with the basic-level 
noun). During entrainment trials, in the historical condition, participants heard 
instructions that referred to the target with a bare noun phrase, while in the ahistorical 
condition, a locative phrase was used. Again, note that the use of a locative in the 
ahistorical condition critically controls for the fact that participants have experience 
clicking on the contrast object, thus allowing us to focus on the lexical differentiation 
process per se. During target trials, target type was manipulated based on the level of 
specificity of the target noun. Unlike Experiment 2, all target trials used bare, unmodified 
NPs. Target trials either referred to the subordinate-level object (e.g., poodle) using the 
subordinate level-term poodle, or the basic-level object (e.g., dock), using the basic level 
term dock. The 16 target trials were rotated through the four conditions across four 
experimental lists. Each participant completed the items on a single list. The experiment 
lasted about 40 minutes. 
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Predictions 
 If listeners generate a lexical differentiation expectation, during interpretation of 
the ambiguous portion of the subordinate level noun (e.g., poo-), the listener should 
initially interpret this as referring to the subordinate target (e.g., poodle) in the historical 
condition, whereas in the ahistorical condition, the listener should initially interpret this 
sequence as referring to the basic-level target (e.g., pool). Such a result would obtain if 
listeners expected the subordinate term (e.g., poodle) in the historical condition, and the 
basic-level-term (e.g., dog) in the ahistorical condition. 
In contrast, in the basic-level noun condition, where the participant hears a basic 
noun like dock, if the listener makes a differentiation-based prediction, he or she should 
be more likely to interpret the ambiguous portion (e.g., do-) as referring to “dock” in the 
historical condition, because the speaker would not re-use the term dog to refer to the 
poodle. If so, this makes the prediction that there should be more fixations on the basic-
level target (e.g., dock) than the critical object (e.g., dog/poodle) in historical condition 
compared to the ahistorical condition.  
By contrast, if listeners are not sensitive to historical context and do not generate 
lexical differentiation expectations, when they hear a basic-level noun, we would expect 
equivalent fixations between cohort object and subordinate level object immediately 
following word onset. Similarly, there would be no difference in fixations to the 
subordinate level object between the historical and ahistorical conditions when listeners 
hear a subordinate level noun.  
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Analysis and Results 
As in Experiment 2, an initial analysis of the acoustic properties of the target 
stimuli demonstrated that there were no significant prosodic differences across conditions 
(t’s<1.00).  
Eye movement analyses focused on the eye-movements made in response to the 
interpretation of the initial phonemes of the target word on test trials. Because the 
difference in the frequency of basic- and subordinate-level nouns is likely to affect the 
time-course of interpretation (Magnuson, Dixon, Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2007), we 
analyzed test trials separately for subordinate and basic-level terms (see Figures 7-8).  
 
 
 
Figure 7. The proportion of target (poodle), competitor (pool), and unrelated (racquet) 
fixations for subordinate level nouns in Experiment 3. The target word is poodle.  
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Figure 8. The proportion of target (dock), competitor (dog/poodle), and unrelated 
(racquet) fixations for basic level nouns in Experiment 3. The target word is dock. 
 
Subordinate level targets (e.g., Click on the poodle) 
 When participants interpreted subordinate level nouns, fixations to the target 
began to rise approximately 400ms following noun onset. If listeners expected 
differentiation, we would expect a larger preference for the subordinate target (poodle) in 
the historical compared to the ahistorical condition. Contrary to predictions, when 
listeners had previously experienced the contrast object (historical condition), there was 
no advantage for interpreting a subordinate-level reference to the target. Eye movements 
for subordinate level expressions were analyzed in two planned 500ms analysis regions, 
100-600ms and 600-1100ms after noun onset (Table 5). To capture both target and 
competitor fixations in a single analysis, we calculated the empirical logit for the ratio of 
target fixations to competitor fixations (.5 was added both the numerator and the 
denominator as the calculation is problematic in the absence of a competitor fixation; see 
	   43	  
Barr, 2008 for a similar approach). The empirical logit was calculated for the two time 
windows for each trial separately. The resulting dependent measure, hereafter “target 
advantage” is symmetrical about zero with positive values indicating a target preference 
and negative values indicating a competitor preference. 
The target advantage scores were analyzed in a mixed effects model with time-
window and entrainment type as fixed effects, and subject and item as random intercepts 
(random slopes did not improve model fit). The model revealed only a main effect of 
time window, with no evidence that participants were more likely to fixate the basic-level 
cohort object in the ahistorical condition, and no interaction with time-window (ps>.5). If 
anything, listeners were more likely to fixate the cohort competitor in the historical 
condition. This result suggests that listeners did not generate lexical differentiation 
expectations, despite the fact that speakers consistently differentiated their expressions. 
 
 
Figure 9. Target advantage scores in each condition. 
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Table 5. Mixed effect model with time-window and historical condition as fixed effects for target advantage score when participants 
heard a subordinate level noun (poodle) in Exp3. 
 Estimate SE t-value pMCM
C 
  Variance Std.Dev. 
(a) overall         
Fixed effects     Random effects    
(intercept) 0.52553 0.21545 2.439 0.0164 Groups Name   
Window 2.00701 0.19119 10.497 0.0001 Subject (Intercept) 0.20665 0.45459 
Entrainment 0.06805 0.27047 0.252 0.8064 Trial (Intercept) 0.34652 0.58866 
Window*Entrainment -0.20998 0.38239 -0.549 0.5896 Residual  4.58753 2.14185 
 
Table 6. Mixed effect model with time-window and historical condition as fixed effects for target advantage score when participants 
heard a basic level noun (dock) in Exp3. 
 Estimate SE t-value pMCMC   Variance Std.Dev. 
(a) overall         
Fixed effects     Random effects    
(intercept) 0.3110 0.1943 1.600 0.1106 Groups Name   
Window 1.9808 0.2205 8.983 0.0001 Subject (Intercept) 0.072625 0.26949 
Entrainment 0.3181 0.3126 1.017 0.3126 Trial (Intercept) 0.172710 0.41558 
Window*Entrainment -0.3304 0.4411 -0.749 0.4492 Residual  5.421875 2.32849 
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Basic-level targets (e.g., Click on the dock) 
 When participants interpreted basic level nouns (e.g., dock) that were cohort-
competitors with the basic-level critical item (e.g., dog), we observed a similar lack of 
differentiation. For basic-level targets, if listeners expected differentiation, we would 
expect a larger preference for the basic-level target (dock) in the historical compared to 
the ahistorical condition (i.e., because of an expectation to refer to the dog as a poodle). 
The eye movement data were analyzed in the same two time-windows as for the analysis 
of interpretation of subordinate-level expressions; 100-600ms and 600-1100ms following 
noun onset. Target advantage scores (calculated as before) were analyzed in a mixed 
effects model with time-window and target type as fixed effects (see Table 6), and 
subjects and items as random intercepts (random slopes did not improve model fit). The 
model included time-window and entrainment as factors and revealed a main effect of 
time-window only, due to increasing target fixations throughout the trial. Contrary to 
predictions, target advantage scores were non-significantly larger in the ahistorical 
condition than historical condition, possibly due to priming of the cohort-competitor term 
dog during entrainment trials. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Our findings show that speakers design their referential expressions with respect 
to a broadly-defined historical context that includes not only previously-established 
names for a given item, but in addition, how other items not present in the immediate 
context had been named in the past. By contrast, two different experiments found no 
evidence that listeners generated complementary expectations about how the speaker 
would refer to a given entity. Instead, comprehension processes were primarily driven by 
the accessibility of the interpreted term, with no apparent penalty for applying the same 
term to multiple referents. These findings suggest that the scope of the relevant discourse 
context for speakers and listeners differs, resulting in subtle asymmetries in the 
relationship between reference and context. 
 
Mechanisms of lexical differentiation 
 The results of Experiment 1 showed that speakers differentiated 24% of all critical 
expressions through the use of two different methods (34% modified and different 
expressions in the contrast condition vs. 10% in the no-contrast condition). This 
differentiation rate was comparable to the effective rates reported by Van Der Wege for 
either typical (33%) or atypical items (19%) in interactive conversation. While both 
studies show clear evidence of differentiation, it is worth noting that speakers were 
content to re-use bare noun phrases to refer to different referents much of the time (66% 
in our experiment), suggesting that, at least in the case of reference to basic objects, not 
differentiating may not be the norm.   
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 Indeed, a combined analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 found that listeners in 
Experiment 2 showed smaller differentiation expectations for target objects that exhibited 
higher name agreement in Experiment 1. This finding suggests that highly established 
names may be resistant to contextual influences. If so, speakers may be reluctant to 
deviate from that name, even if it were to create the potential for confusion by 
homonymy (cf. Clark & Clark, 1979). Thus, differentiation might be more common for 
referents with ill-established names, or for atypical referents. And, when speakers do 
differentiate referents with well established, or highly predictable names, the salience of 
the established name may lead speakers to produce the established name first, followed 
by a description (Gorman, Gegg-Harrison, Marsh, & Tanenhaus, in press; Heller, 
Gorman, & Tanenhaus, 2012), instead of using prenominal modification or subordinate 
terms. If so, this might contribute to listeners’ initial expectation for the unadorned name, 
regardless of the need to differentiate.  
 The coherence of the context may matter as well. Both Experiment 1 and Van Der 
Wege (2009) tested for differentiation in situations where the context (pictures on a 
computer screen) changed from entrainment to test. Speakers and listeners alike might be 
more likely to draw comparisons across contexts and generate stronger differentiation 
predictions in contextually coherent situations, because contextual overlap between 
entrainment and test facilitates retrieval of the previous discourse context (see Horton, 
2007).  
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What is the context of conversation? 
 According to the classic view of conversational processes, interlocutors store rich, 
diary-like representations of jointly held knowledge and beliefs that include 
representations of previously and jointly experienced contexts (Clark & Marshall, 1978; 
Clark, 1992; 1996). In subsequent linguistic exchanges these representations of joint 
experience, or common ground, support communication by providing a shared context 
within which reference can be understood. This view has recently been challenged by an 
alternative view that suggests that sensitivity to joint experience may not require access 
to these rich representations. Instead, according to the association view, associations 
between names, referents and partners serve as simple representations of common ground 
(Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Horton, 2007). Support for this view comes from findings 
that speakers are faster to name an object when the object name (or a semantic associate) 
had been jointly experienced by the dialog partners in the past (Horton, 2007).  
While simple associations might capture some aspects of sensitivity to joint 
experience, our findings suggest that simple associations are not enough to capture the 
breadth of the relevant discourse context in language production. The fact that speakers 
used a different referring expression when they had previously described a referent from 
the same category suggests that the historical representation of the discourse contained 
more than an association between referents and partners. After all, if speakers had only 
formed an association between the contrast and their partner, the semantic association 
between the contrast and target would likely have increased the use of the same basic 
level term. The fact that speakers tended to use a different term instead suggests the 
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historical record included enough information to distinguish the target from the way in 
which the contrast was previously named.  
 Indeed, the idea that interlocutors maintain rich representations of the discourse 
context is consistent with a variety of related findings in a growing literature on the 
processing of dialog. For example, speakers and listeners draw on their knowledge of 
what information has and has not been discussed in the conversation when interpreting 
utterances (Brown-Schmidt, et al., 2008; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; 2012). Further, detailed 
analyses of interactive conversation show that speakers’ and listeners’ representations of 
common ground are highly coordinated, facilitating successful use and interpretation of 
potentially ambiguous expressions (Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2008; Beun & 
Cremers, 1998; Brennan, 2005). Further, when interlocutors do share more common 
ground, they tend to distribute visual attention in a shared screen in a more similar 
manner (Richardson, Dale, & Kirkham, 2007; Richardson, Dale, & Tomlinson, 2009). 
While these findings point to a high degree of coordination in conversation, the 
results of the present research suggest that representations of the historical discourse 
record may be slightly different for speakers and addressees. Speakers, as the authors of 
their utterances, might encode more detailed representations of the historical discourse 
context, resulting in more easily-observable lexical differentiation effects. In contrast, 
listeners have the task of inferring what the speaker believes is the relevant context, and 
then making a prediction about how the speaker would distinguish the intended referent 
against this context. This inferential process may be more error-prone.  
 Given that speakers did show sensitivity to the historical discourse context, a 
critical question is what aspects of the historical discourse record are encoded in 
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conversation. According to the classic view, the relevant discourse context includes rich 
representations of the context of past experience, including information about 
unmentioned, but jointly perceived people and entities (Clark & Marshall, 1978). At a 
minimum, lexical differentiation effects show that speakers encode and subsequently 
retrieve information about how previous discourse referents had been referred to. 
However, an open question is whether speakers consider other aspects of the previous 
discourse context, such as unmentioned properties of previous referents, as well as 
unmentioned contrast objects.  
For example, consider a past context that included a striped cotton shirt and a 
dotted polyester shirt, and the speaker uniquely identified the intended referent by saying 
the striped shirt. Now imagine a future context containing a dotted silk shirt. If the 
speaker only contrasts her expressions with respect to previously-mentioned entities, and 
not unnamed contrasted entities, then the speaker might simply say the dotted shirt to 
differentiate the new referent from the previous referent. However, if the contrast object 
from previous contexts is encoded into the relevant historical context as well, speakers 
might instead say the silk shirt, to distinguish the intended referent from both the 
previous referent and the previous contrast. 
Some recent evidence from a recognition memory paradigm suggests that 
contrasted items are remembered in some cases: Fraundorf, Watson, and Benjamin 
(2010) played stories that introduced contrasting pairs of entities such as British scientists 
and French scientists, and then continued with a sentence that re-mentioned one of the 
entities using a contrastive pitch accent (or not, e.g., The FRENCH scientists…). Results 
from a subsequent memory test showed that invoking contrast with a pitch accent 
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increased memory for the contrasted item (British scientists). This result suggests that at 
least when a contrast has already been established in the discourse, a referring expression 
that invokes contrast can alter the representation of the contrasted item itself.  
 
Overspecification 
Speakers in the Experiment 1 frequently overspecified for the immediate context, 
providing more modifiers or more specific terms than necessary in order to contrast with 
the previous discourse record. The fact that speakers were willing to modify with respect 
to a broader discourse context may explain some apparent overmodification effects in the 
literature, including findings that speakers produce modifiers in single-referent contexts 
about 30% of the time for sentences like “Put the apple that’s on the towel in the box” 
(Engelhardt, et al., 2006). While overspecified with respect to the current trial, speakers 
in these situations might be modifying to contrast the current referent with previous 
referents (e.g., the single apple is currently on the towel but was previously on a sock in a 
different trial). Thus, such apparent violations of the Maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1975) 
may in fact reflect modification with respect to a broader discourse context. 
This evidence of local overmodification is in apparent contrast to evidence that in 
other domains, speakers seem insensitive to ambiguity, even when ambiguity avoidance 
is necessary from the listeners’ perspective (Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Ferreira, 2008). For 
example, while Ferreira, Slevc, and Rogers (2005) found that speakers in their second 
and third experiments used locally ambiguous homophones less often after using those 
homophones to refer to a contrast object, the speakers were still using ambiguous 
homophones about 1/3 of the time. Further, even in cases where speakers do provide 
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disambiguating information, for example, as in the use of helpful prosody, speakers may 
not be doing so to reduce ambiguity for the listener per se (Kraljic & Brennan, 2005). 
One explanation for why speakers in our experiment disambiguated their expressions 
with respect to the historical context may be the type of ambiguity we examined. 
Speakers might have more awareness or control over the potential for ambiguity when 
describing entities from the same basic level object category (e.g., two shirts) compared 
to objects from different categories that have homophonic names, or compared to 
syntactic ambiguity.  
Speakers may also produce additional information when they are not certain 
whether their expression provides enough information for the listener to identify the 
referent (Van Der Sluis & Krahmer, 2007), or when the speaker does not receive 
feedback from the listener (Arts, 2004). Overspecified expressions may also be preferred 
in cases where they reduce the speaker’s effort in assessing the context (Engelhardt et al., 
2006), or when task success is important (Arts et al., 2011a). 
With respect to over-modification in comprehension, the theoretical landscape is 
mixed. Whereas some argue that extra information facilitates comprehension (Arts, 
Maes, Noordman, & Jansen, 2011b; Levelt, 1989), others argue that extra information 
harms comprehension (Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006; Engelhardt, Demiral, & 
Ferreira, 2011). For example, Arts et al. (2011b) compared expressions that included 
information only about the shape of a target item (e.g., the square button), with 
expressions that mentioned three attributes (size, color, and shape, e.g., the large square 
white button). They found that the additional attribute information facilitated 
comprehension and led to faster identification of the target, relative to visual scene onset. 
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Similarly, Paraboni et al. (2007) showed that speakers prefer to use redundant 
expressions when the referential context is potentially confusing and thus the listener 
might select the wrong entity. One reason that redundant information might facilitate 
comprehension in such cases is that the redundant cues can help rule out distractors, and 
thus reducing the effort required for the listener to identify the intended referent.  
However, other studies suggest that unnecessary information can harm 
comprehension. Engelhardt and his colleagues (2006) reported that an unnecessary 
prepositional phrase modifier, “on the towel” in an instruction such as “Put the apple on 
the towel in the box.” impaired comprehension compared to the appropriately informative 
instruction such as “Put the apple in the box”. The locus of these effects might be the fact 
that not only was the prepositional phrase modifier supported by the context (i.e., only 
one apple was in the scene), but in addition, the verb “Put” is often immediately 
followed by a prepositional phrase argument. Thus, in cases where the context supports 
an interpretation of the modifier that is inconsistent with noun-overmodification—for 
example, as an argument of the verb (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 
1995), or as a modifier for a different object that is in a locally-available contrast set 
(Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999), comprehension of overmodification is 
likely to be impaired.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS  
 Here we explored the breadth of the relevant discourse context, examining the 
process of lexical differentiation (Van Der Wege, 2009) in both production and 
comprehension. We identified two different mechanisms through which speakers 
lexically differentiate their referents from other referents in the historical discourse 
context. This result demonstrates that the historical context can license violations of local 
informativity (Olson, 1970; Grice, 1975), and offers support for a context memory view 
of historical context effects, where speakers design expressions with respect to both 
information about how the current referent had previously been referred to (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996), but also information about how contrasting referents from the same 
category had previously been referred to (Van Der Wege, 2009). More generally, our 
findings support a view of common ground in which speakers maintain rich 
representations of the joint discourse context (Clark & Marshall, 1981). Interestingly, 
while speakers showed exquisite sensitivity to the historical discourse record, we found 
no evidence that listeners generated complementary expectations for lexical 
differentiation. Thus, while listeners do show historical sensitivity when a previous 
referent is referred to again (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Brown-
Schmidt, 2009), the present results suggest they are relatively insensitive to how other 
referents were previously referred to. 
Our findings point to an asymmetry in the role of context of language production 
and comprehension, and suggest that while the historical context can shape production, 
this context might not be sufficient to generate specific enough predictions to guide 
comprehension processes. Speakers, who are the authors of their ideas may be more 
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sensitive to things they have experienced and said before, as a result of active 
engagement in assessing the relevant context to design utterances. By contrast, an 
addressee’s representation of the context may be less detailed, and the inferential process 
required to make predictions about how the speaker will design expressions with respect 
to the historical context may be more error-prone. 
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